![]() | Little public testing of the assumptions: The individual not only helps to create behavioral worlds that are | |
| artifacts of his theory-in-use but also cuts himself off from the possibility of disconfirming assumptions in his theory-in-use and thus from the possibility of helping to create behavioral worlds that disconfirm his starting assumptions about them. |
![]() | Self-sealing processes: Public testing of theories-in-use must be accompanied by an openness to changing | |
| behaviour as a function of learning. The actor needs minimally distorted feedback from others. If others provide such feedback - especially if they do so with some risk - and if they experience that the actor is not open to change, they may believe that they have placed themselves in a difficult situation. Their mistrust of the actor will probably increase, but this fact will be suppressed. The result will be the creation of another series of self-sealing processes that again make the actor less likely to receive valid information the next time he tries to test an assumption publicly. |
![]() | This too is a self-reinforcing process: In a world of defensiveness and escalating error, it is understandable | |
| that people will try to protect themselves by striving even harder to be in unilateral control, to win and not lose, to deal with the defensiveness of others ... And this in turn, means that such values as concern, caring, honesty, strength, and courage will likely become identified in ways that support Model I theory-in- use. |
![]() | People are less likely to reflect on their Model I behaviour: As this dysfunctional cycle locks into place, | |
| people become highly skilled in their execution of Model I strategies. Their actions will "work" - in that they achieve their intended objectives while appearing spontaneous, automatic and effortless. As a result, the people in question will be even less likely to reflect on, learn about or modify their Model I behaviour. |
![]() | Mixed messages about which discussion is taboo: It is an elaborate double-bind. Adverse views by one | |
| party about the other become embedded within organizations (e.g. Managers view staff as 'Staff are unrealistic and lacks in cost-consciousness' and staff view managers as 'the underlying problems is the responsibility of managers. Both views become embedded in the organizational norms that govern relationship between line and staff. These feed into a pattern of intergroup conflict typical of line-staff relationships - both see the problem as correctable - if only the other side would change its behaviour. Its purpose is to prevent embarrassment, threat, awkward situations, maintain the status quo and avoid unwanted change. How do we create mixed messages / double-bind? |
![]() | Under these conditions, defensive routines flourish and spread into organizational loops that are known to | |
| all and manageable by none. Here then, is one the most important causes of organizational rigidity and stickiness; defensive routines inexorably get stronger and stronger while the individuals responsible for them believe it is unrealistic or even dangerous to do much about them. The most common reaction to them is a sense of helplessness and the develop a cynical attitude about them: "Nothing will ever change around here." |
![]() | Organizational defensive routines include Band-Aid (Fixes that Backfire and Shifting the Burden) and | |
| cosmetic solutions such as a company that professes to be a Total Quality company or a Learning Organization when, in fact, nothing has changed. They are doing business in the low-productivity way they have for many years. Equal opportunity organizations often still have a glass ceiling firmly in place. |
![]() | Defensive routines happen not only in large organizations; they develop in departments and small work | |
| groups also. It matters because they block learning and slow productivity. |


